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Abstract
Social stereotypes impact how we remember people, but how stable is this influence? Inspired by the reversibility of the
eyewitness misinformation effect through postwarnings about the planting of misinformation (‘enlightenment’), we explored
if stereotype influence on person memory can be similarly reversed. Participants read person self-descriptions and subsequently
answered memory test questions either with or without stereotype labels, establishing sizeable stereotype-induced memory
distortion. One week later, the participants answered the same questions again, but half were enlightened about the earlier
stereotype manipulation. This eliminated the stereotype effect and restored memory for the original information, whereas
memory remained distorted without enlightenment. We discuss implications for memory distortion research and for
(undermining) the self-perpetuation of stereotypes in society.
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What we remember about people can be biased along social
expectations. Numerous studies have shown that social stereo-
types, like other schematic expectations, can lead to distorted
remembering of person-related information (Fyock & Stangor,
1994; Leichtman & Ceci, 1995; Lenton, Blair, & Hastie, 2001;
Macrae, Schloerscheidt, Bodenhausen, &Milne, 2002; Rohner
& Rasmussen, 2012; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992). Importantly, in a societal context, such mem-
ory distortion affords a (pseudo-)validation of the stereotypes
and serves to legitimise and perpetuate them (Fyock & Stangor,
1994; Macrae et al., 2002; Martin, Cunningham, Hutchison,
Slessor, & Smith, 2017; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; van
Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996).
While most studies of stereotype influence on remember-
ing used designs where target persons were already introduced
as members of certain social groups (leading to potential ste-
reotype influence at both encoding and retrieval), there is also
research investigating retroactive stereotype influence,
mimicking situations where the groupmembership of a person
becomes known only after getting to know the person (e.g.,
learning later that a person is a lesbian, or an artist; Snyder &
Uranowitz, 1978; van Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996).
This latter type of design parallels the classic eyewitness mis-
information design (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), in which
postevent misinformation is introduced to bias accounts of
previously witnessed scenes.
Of core interest for the present research, memory distortion
through misinformation is not inevitable, but can often be
limited after the fact by postwarning participants about the
earlier presence of misinformation. In a meta-analysis of 25
studies, Blank and Launay (2014) found that postwarnings
reduced the misinformation effect to less than half of its size
on average, with some warnings (e.g., the ‘enlightenment’
technique introduced by Blank, 1998; see below) being more
effective than others. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that
postwarnings can not only prevent participants from falling
for misinformation but can also reverse an earlier misinforma-
tion effect (Oeberst & Blank, 2012). The latter research
followed the typical misinformation design (i.e., Stage 1: orig-
inal information, e.g., a video; Stage 2: misinformation; Stage
3: memory test) and established the presence of a misinforma-
tion effect, but then added an enlightenment-type postwarning
and a further memory test. In three experiments, the initially
established misinformation effect was completely reversed (in
the third experiment, even after 5 weeks).
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In the present research, we applied this logic to stereotype
influence on memory and explored if a parallel effect reversal
can be achieved by using enlightenment in a stereotype influ-
ence setting. Participants first read person information, then a
stereotype was introduced just before answering a memory
test. This corresponded to a standard retroactive stereotype
influence design (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; van
Knippenberg & Dijksterhuis, 1996), and we expected to find
stereotypical memory distortion. After 1 week, participants
returned, and half of them were told that we had made up
the stereotypical labels applied to the featured persons (i.e.,
we revealed the earlier manipulation to these participants, like
in a debriefing, but already within the experiment). Then, all
participants answered the same memory test again. If enlight-
enment works with stereotypes, then we should expect a sim-
ilar effect reversal as in Oeberst and Blank’s (2012) misinfor-
mation study.
Method
The research included three pilot studies (see the Materials
section) and a main study. The pilot studies served to (1) select
highly stereotypical occupations (in the UK) for an effective
stereotype influence manipulation, (2) produce stereotypical
information for the person descriptions, and (3) provide
stereotypicality ratings for memory test answers.
Participants and design
Combining a student (n = 30) and a general population (n =
38) subsample yielded an initial total of 68 participants. To
counterbalance conditions within each subsample, the data
from four participants were not used for analysis; thus, the
final sample consisted of 64 participants (39 female and 25
male; mean age = 25.6 years, range: 18–59 years), 28 of which
were introductory psychology students (16 female, 12 male;
mean age = 20.6 years, range: 18–30 years), and 36 were
members of the general public (23 female, 13 male; mean
age = 29.5 years, range: 19–59 years). Using two different
subsamples was a matter of convenience, but it increases the
generalisability of our findings.
We investigated stereotype influence through providing an
occupation label for one of two target persons (but not for the
other—counterbalanced across participants). Memory for the
target person information was assessed after 20 min and again
1 week later. Before the second memory test, half of the par-
ticipants were enlightened on the earlier occupational label
manipulation (orthogonal to the students/general public split).
These variables formed a 2 (occupational label: yes/no, with-
in) × 2 (assessment: Time 1/Time 2, within) × 2 (enlighten-
ment: yes/no, between) design. There were two dependent
variables, stereotypical memory distortion and accuracy (see
the Measures section).
Materials
We created self-descriptions of two male characters (Alan and
Greg) in a real-life context, specifically, an actual dating
website (Match.com), for which two of us had registered for
the purposes of the study. These profiles followed a standard
preset format, a mixture of free descriptions under headings
such as ‘a few words about me’ and checklist-type informa-
tion (e.g., relationship status, height, weight, appearance, as-
trological sign; screenshots of the profiles used for the main
study are available as Supplemental Material). The profiles
also included a photograph each, showing Alan or Greg as
moderately attractive men.
Each profile was constructed to be relevant to a particular
social stereotype, based on the input from three pilot studies.
In the first pilot study, we askedN = 10 participants to pick the
two most stereotypical out of a list of 10 UK-typical occupa-
tions; these were builder (later assigned to Greg) and vicar (a
Church of England priest, assigned to Alan), chosen by 60%
and 80% of the judges, respectively. The second pilot study
identified plausible content for Alan’s and Greg’s Match.com
profiles, to be probed later in the memory tests. A further 16
participants described traits, behaviours, activities,
possessions, values, likes and dislikes, as well as
appearance, social class, income, relationship status, and
smoking and drinking habits typically associated with the
occupations of a builder and a vicar. The most frequently
mentioned content was then incorporated into the dating
profiles and/or the memory tests (as response alternatives),
along with more neutral, stereotype-unrelated information.
The profiles did not include any occupation-related informa-
tion, as this was to be used later for the stereotype induction.
The memory tests for the profiles consisted of 20 questions
each, probing factual information from their dating profiles
(e.g., “What does Alan do every Friday night?”—the full tests
are available as Supplemental Material). All questions had
four substantial response alternatives, with varying degrees
of stereotypicality. The latter was assessed in a third pilot
study. We asked another 20 participants to “imagine there is
a vicar called Alan [or a builder called Greg]; you know no
other information about him apart from his occupation” and to
rate the response options “purely based on how stereotypical
you think they are” in relation to the respective occupation, on
a scale from 0 (least stereotypical) to 5 (most stereotypical).
For illustration, for the question “What does Alan do every
Friday night?”, the four alternative responses and their
stereotypicality ratings were “watch game shows” = 1.6, “go
clubbing” = 0.2, “go to his local pub” = 1.8, and “community
work” = 4.1. These ratings across all test questions were used
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to determine the degree of stereotypical memory distortion in
the main study (see the Results section).
Procedure
Participants consented to participate in a two-session study
investigating memory for person information on websites.
They were tested individually or in groups up to eight in quiet
university or everyday settings. Session 1 included three
phases: the dating profiles, a filler task, and memory tests for
the profiles. Instructions and materials were presented via an
automatically timed PowerPoint presentation (shown on PCs/
laptops or a projection screen in group sessions), augmented
by experimenter (L.R. or R.A.) clarifications as needed. The
presentation started with an overview of the first session and
then explained that participants would now see two personal
profiles from a dating website (each spread across three slides)
and were to study them carefully; each profile would be
shown for 6 minutes (2 min per slide). After the profiles had
been presented, participants worked on filler tasks (two
problem-solving tasks and a sudoku puzzle) for 20 min and
then completed two memory tests (one for Alan and one for
Greg); they were allowed 8 min for each test.
The two memory tests were provided as separate book-
lets, with the order of presentation (Alan first, then Greg, or
the reverse) counterbalanced. Participants were asked to
circle one of four answer options for each test question
and also to provide confidence ratings for their choices,
on a 1 to 5 scale. On the front page of each booklet was
a box containing the same photograph of the person as was
shown on the dating profile, as “a reminder of who Alan
[Gregory] is”, alongside other information (two lines stat-
ing, e.g., “username: Alan_d_509” and “gender: male”) in
the right-hand part of the box. The sole purpose of this was
to provide credibility and context for the crucial stereotype
manipulation: The box of one of the booklets contained a
third line stating “occupation: vicar” (or “occupation:
builder”). This was always provided in the second booklet;
our concern was that providing occupation information in
the first booklet would lead participants to expect occupa-
tion information in the second booklet as well, and encour-
age speculations that might influence their test answers in
unpredictable ways (e.g., based on imagined stereotypical
occupations).
Session 2 took place exactly 7 days after Session 1.
Participants filled out the memory tests once again (again,
8 min for each), but, crucially, half of them (orthogonal to
the counterbalancing split) were enlightened on the earlier
stereotype manipulation before answering the tests.
Specifically, the experimenter explained that the occupa-
tion information about Alan (or Greg) on the front page of
the memory test in the first session was incorrect and we
had made it up. We then asked them to complete the
memory tests, as accurately as possible, with this new in-
formation in mind. Participants in the no-enlightenment
group were simply told to answer the memory tests again
based on the information presented about Alan and Greg in
the first session. All instructions in Session 2 were deliv-
ered orally (i.e., the wordings given here are approximate,
but very close). Note that the occupational labels used in
Session 1 were removed from all test booklets in Session 2
(leaving them there after enlightening participants that they
were made up would have been strange, and for compara-
bility we discarded them in the no-enlightenment group as
well). Upon finishing the tests, we fully debriefed all par-
ticipants and asked them not to discuss the true nature of
the study with potential future participants.
Results
Measures
Our analysis focused on two key dependent variables, (1)
stereotypical memory distortion and (2) accuracy. We deter-
mined stereotypical memory distortion in two steps. First,
for each participant, we added up the stereotypicality ratings
(see above) for their chosen answers to the 20 memory test
questions for Alan and Greg. Then, to create more easily
interpretable values and to control for slight differences in
the stereotypicality of the response options for Alan and
Greg, we divided these raw scores by the maximum possible
stereotypicality score (60.6 for Alan and 71.1 for Greg, re-
spectively, if always the most stereotypical answer was cho-
sen). This produced relative stereotypicality scores,
expressed as percentages of the maximum possible stereo-
typical memory distortion for Alan and Greg. The second
dependent variable (accuracy) was the percentage of correct
answers across the 20 memory test questions for Alan and
Greg.
Note that our dependent variables are not redundant—a
correct answer was not always low in stereotypicality.
Specifically, when ranking the answer options for each of
the 40 memory test questions by stereotypicality, the cor-
rect answer occupied Rank 1 (highest stereotypicality)
eight times, 13 times Rank 2, 11 times Rank 3, and eight
times Rank 4 (lowest stereotypicality). In this sense, ste-
reotypical memory distortion and accuracy were separate
aspects of memory performance. Still, the effects of our
stereotype manipulation on these measures were connect-
ed. If occupational labels produce stereotypical memory
distortion, then this must come at the expense of accuracy.
On the o th e r hand , any reduc t i on i n memory
stereotypicality after enlightenment need not necessarily
reinstate memory accuracy (the memory might have been
permanently impaired); this is an open question.
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Stereotypical memory distortion
We conducted a three-way mixed ANOVA to analyse partic-
ipants’ relative stereotypicality scores as a function of occu-
pational label (yes/no, within), assessment (Time 1/Time 2,
within) and enlightenment (yes/no, between).1 This yielded
main effects of all three variables: occupational label, F(1,
62) = 21.71, p < .001, ηp
2 = .26; assessment: F(1, 62) =
11.41, p = .001, ηp
2 = .16; enlightenment: F(1, 62) = 17.16,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .22; an interaction between assessment and
enlightenment, F(1, 62) = 8.83, p = .004, ηp
2 = .12, and, most
important, a three-way interaction, F(1, 62) = 21.37, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .26 (shown in Fig. 1). Further exploration of this inter-
action revealed that the stereotype/occupational label effect
persisted (and descriptively increased; see Fig. 1) in the no-
enlightenment group, Time 1,F(1, 31) = 10.42, p = .003, ηp
2 =
.25; Time 2: F(1, 31) = 20.49, p < .001, ηp
2 = .40, while in the
enlightenment group it was completely eliminated after the
enlightenment, Time 1, F(1, 31) = 12.76, p = .001, ηp
2 =
.29; Time 2, F(1, 31) = 0.02, p = .90, ηp
2 = .00.
To provide some context for the scores shown in Fig. 1,
correct test answers (for Alan and Greg) had a relative
stereotypicality score of 64.4% on average. Interestingly, this
benchmark was surpassed to some degree in all conditions
(even the no-label control conditions), which might reflect
weak and unintended spreading stereotype effects due to the
mere inclusion of stereotype-related material in Alan’s and
Greg’s dating profiles. More important, the stereotype/
occupational label conditions clearly revealed memory distor-
tion above and beyond this level (as shown by one-sample t
tests, df = 31, against the 64.4% benchmark; smallest t = 5.72),
except of course after enlightenment (t = 1.51).
Accuracy
A corresponding three-way ANOVA of participants’ accuracy
scores revealed a complementary pattern of results. Besides
main effects of occupational label, F(1, 62) = 38.44, p < .001,
ηp
2 = .38, and enlightenment, F(1, 62) = 26.98, p < .001, ηp
2 =
.30, as well as interactions between enlightenment and assess-
ment, F(1, 62) = 15.78, p < .001, ηp
2 = .20, and enlightenment
and occupational label, F(1, 62) = 8.64, p = .005, ηp
2 = .12,
there was again a three-way interaction, F(1, 62) = 17.70, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .22 (displayed in Fig. 2). Unpacking of the
interaction showed that the stereotype/occupational label ef-
fect on accuracy persisted (and descriptively increased; see
Fig. 2) in the no-enlightenment group, Time 1, F(1, 31) =
8.13, p = .008, ηp
2 = .21; Time 2: F(1, 31) = 19.73, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .39, while it was—as for stereotypical memory
distortion—completely eliminated in the enlightenment
group, Time 1, F(1, 31) = 29.87, p < .001, ηp
2 = .49; Time
2, F(1, 31) = 0.01, p = .92, ηp
2 = .00.21 We also conducted——as a check of the robustness of our findings——
three-way ANOVAs on the basis of the whole initial sample of 68 participants
(i.e., with imperfect counterbalancing), and using three different random
realisations of a counterbalanced 64-participants sample (i.e., dropping differ-
ent sets of participants from some cells to achieve counterbalancing). These
analyses led to highly similar results. The version we report here is the one that
was in between the two others for most of the main statistics. Further, parallel
analyses to the ones we report here, but incorporating the confidence ratings
from the memory tests (e.g., accuracy scores qualified by confidence), led to
highly similar findings and are therefore not reported.
50
60
70
80
90
Time 1 Time 2
Re
la
v
e 
St
er
eo
ty
pi
ca
lit
y 
(%
)
(A) No Enlightenment
No Label Label
50
60
70
80
90
Time 1 Time 2
Re
la
v
e 
St
er
eo
ty
pi
ca
lit
y 
(%
)
(B) Enlightenment
No Label Label
Fig. 1 Stereotypical memory distortion as a function of enlightenment. a
Standard effect of the stereotype/occupational label at both measurement
times, b Stereotype effect disappears after participants are enlightened on
the earlier stereotype manipulation. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean
2 It is worth noting that both our accuracy and stereotypical memory distortion
findings did not depend on whether Alan or Greg was the target of the stereo-
type induction (i.e., on the counterbalancing condition) or on the subsample of
participants (students or general public). In respective extended ANOVAs, the
critical three-way interactions shown in Figs. 1 and 2 were not compromised
by higher-order interactions involving these additional variables, suggesting
some generalisability of our findings.
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Accuracy as a function of information stereotypicality
So far, we found that stereotypical memory distortion decreased
and accuracy increased after enlightenment. This might mean
that enlightenment restores unbiased access to the original per-
son information. Alternatively, a hypercorrection mechanism
(i.e., simply reversing the stereotypical bias) could produce a
similar overall pattern.3 That is, after enlightenment, people
would pick answers that are less stereotypical, which would
boost memory performance (perhaps even beyond the level of
the no-stereotype control condition) for low-stereotypical cor-
rect answers but produce an opposite effect for correct answers
that are highly stereotypical. Theoretically, these effects might
combine in the stereotype condition to equal control
performance.
To test the contrasting explanations, we analysed accuracy
after enlightenment at Time 2 as a function of the
stereotypicality rank of the correct answer. In a corresponding
4 (stereotypicality rank) × 2 (occupational label) ANOVA,
hypercorrection translates into a predicted interaction between
these factors (more specifically, a linear trend: Accuracy
should increase from most to least stereotypical, relative to
the no-label control). By contrast, our interpretation that en-
lightenment just removes bias and restores access to original
information is independent of the stereotypicality of this orig-
inal information and does not predict an interaction.
The data did not support the hypercorrection idea: There
was little evidence for a stereotypicality Rank × Occupational
Label interaction, F(3, 93) = 1.60, p = .19, ηp
2 = .05, let alone
a linear trend, F(1, 31) = 0.09, p = .76, ηp
2 = .003.4 Instead,
accuracy was more or less flat across stereotypicality rank (see
Fig. 3), in line with the idea that enlightenment corrects (but
not overcorrects) the stereotype influence and restores access
to original person information.
Discussion
To summarise, our participants’ memory for Alan and Greg
was strongly biased in the direction of the stereotypic occupa-
tional labels provided for them at the first assessment, at the
expense of accuracy. The size of both effects was large (ηp
2 >
.20). In the no-enlightenment group, the effects persisted (and
increased in size) at the second assessment 1 week later, even
without a reminder of Alan’s or Greg’s occupation. In the
enlightenment group, however, when participants learned that
the occupations were made up and did not actually apply to
Alan and Greg, the stereotypical bias disappeared, and mem-
ory accuracy was restored to the level of the control condition
(in fact, both effects were reduced to ηp
2 = .00),5 and this held
across all levels of stereotypicality of the original person
information.
The main purpose of our study was to empirically demon-
strate the reversibility of stereotype-induced memory
3 We thank reviewer Bob Belli for proposing this alternative.
4 We also conducted separate t tests for each stereotypicality rank, comparing
accuracy in the label and no-label conditions. Even without Bonferroni cor-
rection, none of these comparisons were significant (lowest p = .07, for Rank
2).
5 In the context of the current replication debate (e.g., Zwaan, Etz, Lucas &
Donnellan, 2018), it is also worth mentioning that the present findings broadly
replicate——and partly bring out more convincingly——a similar pattern of
findings obtained 15 years earlier in a different culture (Germany), but with a
largely identical design (Blank, 2001, Chap. 6). The findings paralleled the
present study for stereotypical memory distortion, but, for accuracy, the critical
interaction was weaker (p = .13). This was likely owed to a smaller effect size,
resulting from different and less reliable measurement (only a few items mea-
sured accuracy). In this sense, the present study (using more reliable accuracy
measurement) is a higher-powered replication of Blank (2001).
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Fig. 2 Accuracy as a function of enlightenment. a Standard effect of the
stereotype/occupational label at both measurement times. b Stereotype
effect disappears after participants are enlightened on the earlier
stereotype manipulation. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean
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distortion; it was not designed to isolate specific processes
underlying this effect reversal. Nevertheless, a few comments
are in order. Principally, the reversal of the effects would be
due to the disruption of any processes that initially produced
the memory distortions. Candidate mechanisms discussed in
the literature include (a) stereotype-consistent response biases
(in itself a heterogeneous category including, e.g., implicit
associations, fluency misattribution, heuristic source monitor-
ing, or intentional guessing; see coverage by Lenton et al.,
2001; Payne, Jacoby, & Lambert, 2004; Rohner &
Rasmussen, 2012; Sherman & Bessenoff, 1999; Stangor &
McMillan, 1992), and (b) biased memory retrieval (i.e., using
the stereotype as a cue for retrieving person information,
which may facilitate access to stereotype-consistent informa-
tion and/or inhibit access to stereotype-inconsistent informa-
tion; e.g., Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978; van Knippenberg &
Dijksterhuis, 1996). Along these lines, unbiased memory per-
formance in our study may have been restored through
disrupting (but not overcorrecting; see our accuracy-by-
stereotypicality analyses) stereotype-consistent biases and/or
stereotype-guided retrieval.
Theoretical and practical implications
The present findings are generally good news both in terms of
the reliability of memory and the implications for stereotype
perseverance. Theoretically, the present findings, combined
with Oeberst and Blank’s (2012) parallel findings on the re-
versibility of the eyewitness misinformation effect, suggest
that previous views of the suggestibility of memory may have
been too extreme. In a popular metaphor, memory has been
described as malleable (Loftus, 1979), just like a piece of
metal hammered on the anvil. While this is (to a considerable
degree, in the light of the massive body of research supporting
it) an apt metaphor, the present research invokes an alternative
metaphor of memory as ‘memory metal’—a metal that can be
hammered out of shape but will spring back into its original
shape under suitable conditions (see, e.g., Kauffman &Mayo,
1993, for an overview). Likewise, it seems to be possible for a
memory to regain—under suitable conditions such as enlight-
enment—its original form after having been distorted. Of
course these two metaphors complement, rather than contra-
dict, each other. But certainly, metaphors guide our views of
phenomena and how we research them, and in this sense the
alternative metaphor proposed here, with its emphasis on
memory resilience, is a welcome antidote to the current focus
on memory distortion and malleability (see, e.g., Nash & Ost,
2017).
Regarding practical consequences of the reversibility of
stereotype-conserving memory distortion, the message is per-
haps that attention needs to be paid to detail. Firstly, we ac-
knowledge that the present research applies to only one kind
of real-life situations—namely, when stereotypes are intro-
duced after the fact. We cannot be sure that the present find-
ings would extend to situations where stereotypes already in-
fluence the encoding of person information. Moreover, our
enlightenment manipulation undermined the applicability of
a stereotype to a particular case, not the stereotype itself.
While there are certainly real-life equivalents of this (e.g.,
cases of mistaken identity or group membership), it would
seem much harder to undermine stereotype influence when
such a move is not possible (but still feasible in principle;
e.g., Todd, Galinsky, & Bodenhausen, 2012, showed that
memory distortion due to an unmistakable stereotype—
race—can be limited through asking people to adopt the per-
spective of the targeted protagonist). In any case, the current
demonstration that it is possible to completely undo stereotype
influence on memory under some circumstances may encour-
age future research to explore the circumstances under which
the preservation of stereotypes can be disrupted more
generally.
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